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1 Introduction
In finite dimensional markets with short-selling, conditions on agents’ utilities
insuring the existence of equilibria ( or equivalent to the existence of equilib-
ria ) are by now well understood. In particular they can be interpreted as
no-arbitrage conditions. In an uncertainty setting, where agents have differ-
ent beliefs and different risk aversions, as originally shown by Hart (1974), the
no-arbitrage conditions may be interpreted as compatibility of agent’s risk ad-
justed beliefs. There is a huge literature on sufficient and necessary conditions
for the existence of equilibria. In finite dimension, one can refer, for instance to
Page (1987), Werner (1987), Nielsen (1989), Page and Wooders (1995, 1996),
Allouch (1999), Allouch et al (2000). In infinite dimension asset markets, the
no-arbitrage condition used for finite dimension do not imply existence of equi-
librium. The standard assumption is to assume that the individually rational
utility set is compact ( see e.g. Cheng (1991), Brown and Werner (1995), Dana
and Le Van (1996), Dana et al (1997), Dana and Le Van (2000), Le Van and
Truong Xuan (2001).)
In this paper, we consider paper a model with an infinite number of states of
nature, a finite number of agents and Von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities
with different expectations.
More precisely, we consider a model where the utility of agent i is
U i(xi) =
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)
where pii is her belief and xi is her consumption. The commodity space is lp(pi)
with p ∈ {1, . . . ,+∞}.
When the number of states is finite, say K states, following Werner (1987), one
can introduce for any agent i the set of useful vectors W i to obtain the set
of no-arbitrage prices denoted by Si, which are defined as the set of vectors p
which satisfy p ·w > 0 for any w ∈W i \{0}. We say that the no-arbitrage holds
if ∩iSi 6= ∅. When the utility functions are strictly concave, strictly increasing,
this condition ensures the compactness of the individually rational allocations
set. Dana and Le Van (2010) introduce for every agent i the convex cone P i
generated by the vectors {piisui′(xis)}s=1,...,K where xi ∈ RK and ui′(+∞) <
ui′(xis) < ui′(−∞), ∀s, ∀i. The no-arbitrage cone Si is proved to be the interior
of the cone P i.
In this paper, following Dana and Le Van (2010), we define no-arbitrage prices
p for agent i as follows: for any state s,
ps = λipi
i
su
i′(xis)
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where λi > 0, x
i ∈ l∞ and
ui′(+∞ < ui′(xis) < ui′(−∞)
We say that the no-arbitrage condition (NA) holds if :
λipi
i
su
i′(xis) = λjpi
j
su
j′(xjs),∀i,∀j.
When the number of states is finite, as we said before, condition (NA) ensures
existence of equilibrium. When the number of states is infinite, this condition
only ensures the boundedness of the individually rational utility set. We give
examples where (NA) is satisfied and no equilibrium exists. The strategy is
therefore to give assumptions which imply the compactness of the individually
rational utility set and hence existence of equilibrium. Our conditions might
be considered as the weakest since we give also examples of non existence of
equilibrium when these conditions do not hold.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and
define the equilibrium. In section 3, we introduce no-arbitrage conditions and
relate them to the problem of existence of equilibrium. We show, through
examples, that no-arbitrage conditions we introduce do not ensure existence of
equilibrium. However if we assume the compactness of the individually rational
utility set then we get an equilibrium. In Section 4, we give conditions for the
compactness of the individually rational utility set. We give examples of non-
existence of equilibrium when these conditions fail. Finally, proofs are put in
Section Appendix. We mention that our methods of proofs are inspired by the
ones in Le Van and Truong Xuan (2001). However, their model rules out the
risk-neutral agents. That is not the case in our model.
2 The model
There are m agents indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m. The belief of agent i in state s is
piis ≥ 0, and
∑∞
s=1 pi
i
s = 1 . Let us denote by pi the mean probability
1
m
∑
i pi
i.
We first assume:
A0: pii is equivalent to pij for any i, j i.e. there exists a number h > 0 such
that h ≤ piis
pijs
≤ 1h for all i, j, s.1
Under A0, without loss of generality, one can assume that piis > 0 for any i,
any s. In this paper, we always suppose that the condition A0 is satisfied and
piis > 0 for any i, any s.
The consumption set of agent i is Xi = lp(pi) with p ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,+∞} and
agent i has an endowment ei ∈ lp(pi). We assume that for each agent i there
1We observe that when all agents have the same belief as in Cheng (1991), then A0 is
satisfied.
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exists a concave, strictly increasing, differentiable function ui : R → R , such
that, for any i, the function
U i(xi) =
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)
is real-valued for any xi ∈ Xi.
Agent i has lp(pi) as consumption set, ei as initial endowment and U i as
utility function, with i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a list
(
(xi∗)i=1,...,m, p∗)
)
such that xi∗ ∈ Xi for
every i and p∗ ∈ lq+(pi) \ {0} and
(a) For any i, U i(x) > U i(xi∗)⇒∑∞s=1 p∗sxs >∑∞s=1 p∗seis
(b)
∑m
i=1 x
i∗ =
∑m
i=1 e
i.
Define
ai = inf
x
ui′(x) = ui′(+∞)
bi = sup
x
ui′(x) = ui′(−∞).
Let I1 be the set of indexes i such that a
i < bi, and I2 be the set of indexes
such that ai = bi (the set of risk neutral agents).
We add:
Definition 2 1. The individually rational attainable allocations set A is de-
fined by
A = {(xi) ∈ (lp(pi))m |
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
ei and U i(xi) ≥ U i(ei) for all i}.
2. The individually rational utility set U is defined by
U = {(v1, v2, ..., vm) ∈ Rm | ∃x ∈ A s.t U i(ei) ≤ vi ≤ U i(xi) for all i}.
3 No-arbitrage condition and existence of equilib-
rium
We will first introduce a notion of no-arbitrage price based on useful vectors
introduced by Werner.
A vector w ∈ lp(pi) is useful for agent i if for any x ∈ Xi, we have
U i(x+ λw) ≥ U i(x), ∀λ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Xi
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or equivalently
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xs + λws) ≥
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xs), ∀λ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Xi.
Let W i denote the set of useful vectors for agent i. It is easy to check that W i
is a closed convex cone.
A vector p is a weak no-arbitrage price for agent i if it is in lq(pi) and if it
there exists r ∈ lq(pi) s.t.:
∀s, ps = piisrs
and
∞∑
s=1
psws > 0, for any w ∈W i \ {0}
In models with a finite number of states of nature, this is the Werner’s definition
of no-arbitrage prices.
Let σi be the set of weak no-arbitrage prices for agent i. A weak no-arbitrage
(WNA) condition will be
∩iσi 6= ∅.
In the case of a finite number of states, the existence of a Werner’s no-
arbitrage price is sufficient to ensure the existence of equilibrium. In infinite
dimension models, this property is not true.
We add another notion of arbitrage price. Let Si be the set of vectors p
in lq(pi) which satisfy
∑
s≥1 pi
i
sp(s)w(s) > 0 for any w ∈ W i \ {∅}. In finite
dimension, Si is called the set of no-arbitrage prices of agent i. If W i contains
no line then Si is open. In our case, since W i contains lp+(pi), the set S
i has an
empty interior if p > 1. However, one can show (see Dana and Le Van (2010))
that w is useful for agent i if and only if
∀x ∈ Xi,
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xs)ws ≥ 0.
Observe that if ui is strictly concave then for any x ∈ Xi and w ∈ W i, the
function λ 7→ U i(x + λw) is strictly increasing. In this case, if w ∈ W i \ {0},
then
∀x ∈ Xi,
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xs)ws > 0.
Following Dana and Le Van (2010), for any agent i, we consider the vectors
p ∈ lq(pi) defined by
∀s, ps = λipiisui′(xis).
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Observe that p ∈ σi.
We introduce the assumption:
There exists p ∈ l∞(pi), x ∈ l∞(pi), λi > 0 such that
ps = λ
ipiisu
i′(xis) for all s.
This condition is equivalent to the following no-arbitrage condition:
(NA) λipiisu
i′(xis) = λ
jpijsu
j′(xjs) = λ
kakpi
k
s , ∀s, ∀i ∈ I1, ∀j ∈ I1, ∀k ∈ I2
with xi ∈ lp(pi),∀i ∈ I1 and
∀i ∈ I1, ai < inf
s
ui′(xis) < sup
s
ui′(xis) < b
i.
If we assume that for all i ∈ I1, we have ai < ui′(x) < bi, ∀ x, then in
finite dimension models, weak no-arbitrage (WNA) and no-arbitrage (NA)
are equivalent and also equivalent to the existence of equilibrium. In our model
with an infinitely countable set of natures, sufficient conditions for (NA) are
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) If (NA) holds, then U is bounded
(ii) Assume either ui′(−∞) = +∞ for all i ∈ I1 or ui′(+∞) = 0 for all
i ∈ I1.
(ii.1) If I2 = ∅, then no arbitrage condition (NA) holds.
(ii.1) When I2 6= ∅, no arbitrage condition (NA) holds if, and only if,
pii = pij , ∀i ∈ I2,∀j ∈ I2.
Proof : See Appendix.
No-arbitrage condition (NA) does not warrant existence of equilibrium in
presence of an infinite number of states of nature. We give an example of an
economy with two agents, and with an infinitely countable number of states of
nature, where the no-arbitrage condition (NA) is satisfied, and there exists no
equilibrium.
Example 1 Consider an economy with two agents (i = 1, 2), with endowments
equal to 0. The probabilities are equivalent: pi1s =
(
1
2
)s
, pi2s =
1
Sα
1−αs
2s , where
1 < α < 1, and Sα =
∑
s
1−αs
2s .
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The rewarded utilities satisfy
u1′(x) = b1, ∀x ≤ 0
u1′(+∞) = 0
u1(0) = 0
u2′(x) = a2, ∀x ≥ 0
u2′(−∞) = +∞
u2(0) = 0
There exists z > 0 with u1′(z) < b1. Let x1s = z,∀s. Since u2′(−∞) = +∞,
there exists x2s < 0 which satisfies
u2′(0) = (1− αs)u2′(x2s)
One can check that
λpi1su
1′(x1s) = pi
2
su
2′(x2s), ∀s
with λ = u
2′(0)
u1′(z) × 1Sα . Since
0 = u1′(+∞) < u1′(z) = u1′(x1s) < b1
a2 = u2′(0) <
u2′(0)
1− αs = u
2′(x2s) < u
2′(−∞) = +∞
no-arbitrage condition (NA) is satisfied.
We now show that no equilibrium exists. Assume there exists an equilibrium
(p, (x1, x2)) with x1s = xs = −x2s. We have
∀s, λ1pi1su1′(xs) = λ2pi2su2′(−xs)
or λpi1su
1′(xs) = pi2su
2′(−xs), with λ = λ1
λ2
For all s:
λ′
1
2s
u1′(xs) =
1− αs
2s
u2′(−xs)
or equivalently
λ′ = (1− αs)u
2′(−xs)
u1′(xs)
, ∀s
with λ′ = λSα. Since
∑
s psxs = 0 and ps > 0 for any s, one must have s0 with
xs0 ≤ 0. In this case
λ′ = (1− αs0)a
2
b1
and for any s 6= s0, xs > 0. We then obtain
u2′(−xs0+1)
u1′(xs0+1)
>
u2′(0)
u1′(0)
=
a2
b1
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since xs0+1 > 0. Now, because 1 − αs0+1 > 1 − αs0 we obtain, on the one one
hand:
λ′ = (1− αs0+1)u
2′(−xs0+1)
u1′(xs0+1)
> (1− αs0)u
2′(−xs0+1)
u1′(xs0+1)
> (1− αs0)a
2
b1
and on the other hand
λ′ = (1− αs0)a
2
b1
which is a contradiction. Then there exists no equilibrium.
In infinite dimension, with a vector space L as commodity space, Brown and
Werner [4], Dana, Le Van and Magnien [9] assume the compactness of U and
get existence of equilibrium with prices in L′. For our model, we will prove that
when the commodity space is l∞, we get an equilibrium with prices in l1(pi).
Theorem 1 Assume A0. Our model has an equilibrium if we add the assump-
tion that U is compact. If Xi is lp(pi) with 1 ≤ p < +∞ then the equilibrium
price p∗is in lq(pi). If p = +∞, then p∗ ∈ l1(pi).
Proof : Since U is compact and Xi is lp(pi) there exists an equilibrium ((xi∗), p∗)
(see Dana and al (1997)) with xi∗ ∈ lp(pi).
When 1 ≤ p < +∞, the price p∗ belongs to lq(pi). When p = ∞ we will
show that the equilibrium price belongs to l1(pi). The equilibrium price can be
written as p∗ + φ where p∗ ∈ l1(pi) and φ is a purely finitely additive function.
For any i, the equilibrium allocation xi∗ solves the problem:
max
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)
s.t.
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s + φ(x
i) =
∞∑
s=1
p∗se
i
s + φ(e
i)
From Theorem V.3.1, page 91, in Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa in [2], for any i,
there exists ζi s.t.
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(x∗is )− ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
∗i
s + φ(x
i∗)) ≥
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xs)− ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sxs + φ(x
i)).
Suppose that φ 6= 0. Since φ ≥ 0, then φ(1) > 0 , with 1 = (1, 1, 1, . . .). Define
xi(N) as:
8
xis(N) = x
i∗
s with s = 1, 2, . . . , N.
xis(N) = x
i∗
s − 1 with s ≥ N + 1.
Observe that xi(N) ∈ l∞(pi). We have:
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xi∗s )−ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
∗i
s +φ(x
i∗)) ≥
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis(N))−ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s(N)+φ(x
i(N))).
⇒∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(xi∗s )−ζi(
∑
s≥N+1
p∗sx
∗i
s +φ(x
i∗)) ≥
∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(xi∗s −1)−ζi(
∑
s≥N+1
p∗s(x
i∗
s −1)+φ(xi∗−1)).
⇒∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(xi∗s )−
∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(xi∗s − 1)− ζi
∑
s≥N+1
p∗s ≥ ζi(φ(xi∗)− φ(xi∗ − 1)) = ζiφ(1).
Let N → ∞, the LHS converges to 0. This implies φ(1) ≤ 0: a contradiction.
Hence φ = 0.
Notice that if A is compact for the l1(pi) topology, then U is compact. And
we get an equilibrium. The proof of the compactness of U uses the fact that for
all i, U i is upper semi-continuous on the projection of A on the ith-component.
4 Sufficient conditions to obtain the compactness of
U
Proposition 2 Assume (A0). If bi = +∞ for all i, the allocation set A is
l1(pi)-compact.
Proof : It is given in Appendix. We prove that A which is bounded in l1(pi)
satisfies Dunford-Pettis criterion. Hence it is σ(l1(pi), l∞(pi))-compact. We
prove however that a bounded set in l1(pi) is compact for the l1(pi)-topology if
and only if it is σ(l1(pi), l∞(pi))-compact.
Proposition 3 Assume (A0). If ai = 0 for all i, then U is compact.
Proof : See Appendix.
Remark 1 In Example 1, we have a model with two agents. Agent 1 has
a1 = 0, b1 < +∞. Agent 2 has a2 > 0, b2 = +∞. The assumptions of
Propositions 2 and 3 are not satisfied. We still have no-arbitrage condition and
we have no equilibrium in this model.
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Proposition 4 Assume (A0). Assume I2 6= ∅. If ai = 0 and bi = +∞ for all
i ∈ I1 and (NA) holds, then U is compact.
Proof : See Appendix.
We can be surprised that in presence of risk-neutral agents we have to
impose ui′(+∞) = 0 and ui′(−∞) = +∞ for any agent i ∈ I1. We give below
an example with two agents. The first is risk-neutral while the second is risk-
averse. The utility of the latter agent only satisfies either the marginal utility
at +∞ equals 0 or the marginal utility at −∞ is +∞. In this example there
exists no equilibrium.
Example 2 Consider an economy with two agents (i = 1, 2), with endowments
equal to 0. The probabilities are equivalent: pi1s =
(
1
2
)s
, pi2s =
1
Sα
1−αs
2s , where
1 < α < 1, and Sα =
∑
s
1−αs
2s .
Case 1
The rewarded utilities satisfy
u1′(x) = 1, ∀x ∈ R
u2′(x) = a2, ∀x ≥ 0
u2′(−∞) = +∞
u2′(x) > a2 ∀x < 0.
Assume there exists an equilibrium (p, (x1, x2)). Then x1s = −x2s = xs for any
s. There exists λ > 0 such that
λ
2s
u1′(xs) =
1− αs
Sα2s
u2′(−xs)∀s
⇔ u2′(−xs) = λ Sα
1− αs∀s.
Since
∑
s psxs = 0 and ps > 0 for all s, there exists xs0 ≤ 0, i.e −xs0 ≥ 0.
Then
a2 = λ
Sα
1− αs0
and ∀s 6= s0, xs > 0. Hence u2′(−xs0+1) > a2. This implies
λ
Sα
1− αs0+1 > λ
Sα
1− αs0 ⇒ α
s0+1 > αs0 .
A contradiction.
Case 2
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The rewarded utilities satisfy
u1′(x) = b1, ∀x ≤ 0
u1′(+∞) = 0
u1′(x) < b1 ∀x > 0
u2′(x) = 1 ∀x ∈ R.
Assume there exists an equilibrium (p, (x1, x2)). Then x1s = −x2s = xs for any
s. There exists λ > 0 such that
u1′(xs) = λ
1− αs
Sα
∀s.
Since
∑
s psxs = 0 and ps > 0 for all s, there exists xs0 ≤ 0, i.e −xs0 ≥ 0.
Then
b1 = λ
1− αs0
Sα
and ∀s 6= s0, xs > 0. Hence u1′(xs0+1) < b1. This implies
λ
1− αs0+1
Sα
< λ
1− αs0
Sα
⇒ αs0+1 > αs0 .
A contradiction.
5 Appendix
The following Lemma is required for the proofs of propositions 1, 2, 3, 4. It
basically shows that if (NA) is satisfied then, on the one hand, the projection
Ai of A on the ith− component is bounded for any i ∈ I1 and, on the other
hand, agents in I2 have the same belief.
Lemma 1 Assume (NA).
(i) For all i, j ∈ I2 we have pii = pij.
(ii) Denote by piI the same probability of belief of agents in I2. There exists a
constant C > 0 which depends only on p, x, e such that for any (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ A
we have ∞∑
s=1
piis|xis| ≤ C for all i ∈ I1
and ∞∑
s=1
piIs |
∑
i∈I2
xis| ≤ C.
(iii) U is bounded.
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Proof :
Take any (NA) price p. There exists (xi), {λi > 0}i such that for all i, s:
ps = λipi
i
su
i′(xis).
(i) For i, j ∈ I2 we have λiaipiis = λjajpijs, ∀s. This implies
∞∑
s=1
λia
ipiis =
∞∑
s=1
λja
jpijs.
This implies λia
i = λja
j , hence pii = pij .
(ii) We firstly prove that the exists C > 0 such that:∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
piis|xis| ≤ C.
Define e′ = e−∑i∈I2 xi = ∑i∈I1 xi ∈ l1(pi).
For i ∈ I1, since ai < infs ui′(xis) ≤ sups ui′(xis) < bi, we have xi ∈ l∞(pi).
Observe that p ∈ l∞(pi).
Choose η > 0 such that
ai < ui′(xis)(1 + η) < b
i for (1)
for all i ∈ I1. Then we define the price q as follows: ∀i, j ∈ I1,
qs = ps(1 + η) = λipi
i
su
i′(xis)(1 + η) = λjpi
j
su
j′(xjs)(1 + η).
It follows from (1) that, for each i ∈ I1, there exist zi such that ∀s, qs =
λipi
i
su
i′(zis). Observe that ai < infs ui′(zis) ≤ sups ui′(zis) < bi, so zi ∈ l∞(pi).
Observe also that ∀s, ps < qs.
Denote
x+ : =
{
x if x > 0
0 if x ≤ 0
x− : =
{
−xi if x < 0
0 if x ≥ 0
Notice that x = x+−x−, |x| = x+ +x− and u(x) = u(x+) +u(−x−)−u(0).
Now we fix N ∈ N. For i ∈ I1, from the concavity of the utility function ui
we have
λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)− λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(xi+s ) ≥ λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xis)(x
i
s − xi+s )
λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(zis)− λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(−xi−s ) ≥ λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(zis)(z
i
s + x
i−
s ).
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Therefore,
λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(zis)x
i−
s ≤ λi
N∑
s=1
piis[u
i(zis) + u
i(xis)− ui(xi+s )− ui(−xi−s )]
−λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(zis)z
i
s + λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xis)x
i+
s − λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xis)x
i
s.
Define U iN (x) :=
∑N
s=1 pi
i
su
i(xs). Note that limN→∞ U iN (x) = U
i(x). The
above inequality implies
N∑
s=1
qsx
i−
s ≤ λi[U iN (zi) + U iN (xi)− U iN (xi)− U iN (0)]
−
N∑
s=1
qsz
i
s +
N∑
s=1
psx
i+
s −
N∑
s=1
psx
i
s
≤ λi[U iN (zi) + U iN (xi)− U iN (xi)− U iN (0)]
−
N∑
s=1
pisx
i
s −
N∑
s=1
qsz
i
s +
N∑
s=1
psx
i+
s
= CiN +
N∑
s=1
psx
i+
s
where CiN = λi[U
i
N (z
i) + U iN (x
i)− U iN (xi)− U iN (0)]−
∑N
s=1 p
i
sx
i
s −
∑N
s=1 qsz
i
s.
Observe that since xi et zi belong to l∞(pi), the limit limN CiN exists.
Hence, ∀i
N∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s ≤ CiN +
N∑
s=1
psx
i
s.
Thus, we have
∑
i∈I1
N∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s ≤
∑
i∈I1
CiN +
∑
i∈I1
N∑
s=1
psx
i
s =
∑
i∈I1
CiN +
N∑
s=1
pse
′
s.
Since e′ ∈ l1(pi), ∑i∈I1 CiN + ∑Ns=1 pse′s converges. Now let N tends to
infinity. Notice that U iN (x)→ U i(x) for all x, and recall that U i(xi) ≥ U i(ei),
with xi, zi ∈ l∞(pi). We then have
lim sup
N→∞
CiN ≤ λi[U i(zi) + U i(xi)− U i(ei)− U i(0)]−
∞∑
s=1
qsz
i
s −
∞∑
s=1
psx
i
s =: C
i.
Thus, ∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s ≤
∑
i∈I1
Ci +
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s =: C1 +
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s.
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We also have∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)(xi+s − xi−s ) =
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xis =
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)e′s
which implies
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi+s =
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)e′s +
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s
≤ C1 +
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s +
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)e′s
= C1 +
∞∑
s=1
qse
′
s.
Thus for i ∈ I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)|xis| ≤ 2C1 +
∞∑
s=1
(ps + qs)e
′
s
= 2C1 + (2η + 1)
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s
= 2C1 + (2η + 1)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2η + 1)
∑
i∈I2
∞∑
s=1
psx
i
s
= 2C1 + (2η + 1)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2η + 1)
∑
i∈I2
λia
i
∞∑
s=1
piisx
i
s
= 2C1 + (2η + 1)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2η + 1)
∑
i∈I2
λiU
i(xi)
≤ 2C1 + (2η + 1)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2η + 1)
∑
i∈I2
λiU
i(ei)
= C2.
then
η
∞∑
s=1
ps|xis| ≤ C2.
Let µi := infs u
i′(x¯is) > 0, and µ := mini µi. Then
∑∞
s=1 ps|xis| ≥ µ
∑∞
s=1 pi
i
s|xis|
which implies for all i ∈ I1 ∞∑
s=1
piis|xis| ≤ D1
with D1 = C
2/(ηµ).
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For I2 we have:
∞∑
s=1
piIs |
∑
i∈I2
xis| ≤
∞∑
s=1
piIs |es|+
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
piis|xis|
≤ D2
with D2 =
∑∞
s=1 pi
I
s |es|+ |I1|D1.
We take C = max{D1, D2}.
(iii) The utility set U is bounded by Jensen inequality.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The proof of the boundedness of U comes from Lemma 1.
(ii.1) Consider the case where I2 = ∅.
(a) Assume ui′(−∞) = +∞, for any i. Let a satisfy a1 < u1′(a). For i > 1, let
ζis =
pi1s
piis
u1′(a),∀s
Then 1hu
1′(a) ≥ ζis ≥ hu1′(a). One can find λi s.t. ζ
i
s
λi
≥ αi > ai. Define
ui′(xis) =
ζis
λi
, ∀s
Then
ai < αi ≤ ui′(xis) ≤
1
λih
u1′(a), ∀s
Since bi = +∞, we have xi ∈ l∞. Obviously
λipiisu
i′(xis) = pi
1
su
1′(a),∀s.
(b) Assume ui′(+∞) = 0 for all i. Let a satisfy 0 < u1′(a) < b1. Define ζis as
before. We have ζis ≤ 1hu1′(a). Choose λi s.t. ζ
i
s
λi
≤ βi < bi. Then define xis as
before in A.1. Using the same arguments, we have
λipiisu
i′(xis) = pi
1
su
1′(a),∀s.
(ii.2) Now we consider the case where I2 6= ∅. If (NA) holds, from Lemma
1,pik = pil,∀k ∈ I2,∀l ∈ I2.
Conversely, assume that pik = pil = pi′,∀k ∈ I2,∀l ∈ I2. Assume 1 ∈ I2. For
i ∈ I2, i 6= 1, choose λi such that λiai = a1.
Consider the case ui′(−∞) = +∞, ∀i ∈ I1.
For i ∈ I1, choose as before ζis:
1
h
a1 ≥ ζis =
a1pi
′
s
piis
≥ a1h
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There exists λi s.t.
ζis
λi
≥ αi > ai
and
ai < ui′(xis) =
ζis
λi
≤ 1
h
a1.
Since bi = +∞, we have xi ∈ l∞.
The same argument as before if ui′(+∞) = 0,∀i ∈ I1.
Lemma 2 A closed, bounded set B in l1(pi) is compact if and only if B satisfies
the following property: For all  > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that for all x ∈ B
we have ∑
s≥N
pis|xs| < .
Proof : Suppose that B is compact and there exists a subsequence {x(n)}n of
B,  > 0 such that
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs(n)| > ,∀n.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that x(n) converges to x in l1(pi) or
‖x(n)− x‖l1(pi) → 0.
By choosingN large enough such that ‖x(n)−x‖l1(pi) < 2 and
∑
s≥n pis|xs| <

2 for all n ≥ N . And for all n ≥ N we have
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs| ≥
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs(n)| −
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs(n)− xs|
> − 
2
=

2
.
A contradiction.
Now we suppose that for any  > 0, there exists N such that ∀x ∈ B,∑∞
s=N pis|xs| < .
We have to prove that for any sequence x(n) ∈ B, there exists a convergent
subsequence of x(n) in l1(pi).
SinceB is bounded in l1(pi), there exists a > 0 such that, ∀ x ∈ B, ∑s≥1 pis|xs| ≤
a.
Since {x(n)}n belong to a compact set for the product topology, there exists
a subsequence {x(nk)}k converges to x for the product topology. In particular
for all s, xs(nk) converges to xs when k →∞.
Fix  > 0. We will prove that for k, l big enough, ‖x(nk)− x(nl)‖l1(pi) < .
Choose N > 0 such that for all x ∈ B, ∑s≥N pis|xs| < 4 . Choose M such that
for all nk > M we have
∑M
s=1 pis|xs(nk) − xs| < 4 . For all nk ≥ N0, nl ≥ N0
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where N0 = max{N,M} we have
∑N0
s=1 pis|xs(nk)−xs(nl)| ≤
∑N0
s=1 pis|xs(nk)−
xs|+
∑N0
s=1 pis|xs(nk)− xs| < 2 .
Then
∑
s≥1
pis|xs(nk)− xs(nl)| ≤
N0−1∑
s=1
pis|xs(nk)− xs(nl)|+
∑
s≥N0
pis|xs(nk)|+
∑
s≥N0
pis|xs(nl)|
< 
Hence {x(nk)}k is a Cauchy sequence, then it converges in l1(pi) topology. So
B is compact in l1(pi) topology.
Corollary 1 1. A closed, bounded set B in l1(pi) is compact for l1(pi)-topology
if and only if it is compact for the weak topology σ(l1(pi)), l∞(pi)).
2. A closed, bounded set B in lp(pi), p > 1 is compact for l1(pi).
Proof : 1. Since Lemma 2 is equivalent to the Dunford-Pettis criterion, the
result follows.
2. For p > 1, a closed bounded set is σ(lp, lq)-compact. But it is also σ(l1, l∞)-
compact, since lp(pi) ⊂ l1(pi) and l∞ ⊂ lq(pi). Apply statement 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
The idea of the proof is that, if the attainable allocation sequence does not
belong to a weakly compact set, then for some state s, there will be an agent i
such that xis tends to +∞ and an agent j such that xjs tends to −∞. Then by
reducing xis and increasing x
j
s, the value of U i(xi) does not diminish very much.
Because bj = +∞, the value of U j(xj) will become very large, even tends to
infinity, and that leads us to a contradiction with the bounded property of U .
Assume the contrary: A is not compact. Then from Lemma 1, there exists
a sequence {(x1(n), x2(n), ..., xm(n))}n ⊂ A, an agent i and a constant  > 0
such that
∀ n,
∞∑
s=n
piis|xis(n)| > .
Denote for all k, vk := lim supn→∞ Uk(xk(n)).
By Lemma 1, A is bounded in l1(pi). We can suppose, without loss general-
ity, that
∑∞
s=n pi
i
s|xis(n)| → ci > 0 when n→∞. This implies limn
∑∞
s=n pi
i
sx
i+
s (n)−
limn
∑∞
s=n pi
i
sx
i−
s (n) = c
i. The limits of these two sums exist because xi ∈ l1(pi).
We know that
∑
j 6=i x
i
s(n) = es − xis(n). So, for every s, ∃j such that xjs(n) ≤
−xis(n)−|es|m−1 . Since there is a finite number of agents j 6= i, we can assume that,
for simplicity, there exist i and j which satisfy two properties:
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1. ∃ Ein ⊂ N ∩ {s ≥ n}, xis > 0 for all s ∈ Ein and
lim
n
∑
s∈Ein
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i > 0.
2. For all s ∈ Ein
xjs(n) ≤ −
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 .
With each M > 0, define the set Sin ⊂ Ein as follows
Sin = {s : xis(n) > |es|+M(m− 1)}. (2)
We have an observation: limn
∑
Ein\Sin pi
i
sx
i
s(n) = 0. Indeed
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piisx
i
s(n) ≤
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piis (|es|+M(m− 1))
≤
∞∑
s=n
piis|es|+M(m− 1)
∞∑
s=n
piis
which tends to zero, since e ∈ l1(pi).
Hence we have Sin 6= ∅ for all n big enough, and
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Sin
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i.
We have
xjs(n) ≤
|es| − xis(n)
m− 1 < −M. (3)
Since pii and pij are equivalent, we can assume that limn
∑
s∈Sin pi
j
sxis(n) = c
j >
0. Notice that these limits do not depend on M .
Define α := min(vk, vi − ui′(0)cim−1 ) − 1, (k = 1, . . . ,m). Define Aα the set of
(xk) ∈ l1(pi) satisfies Uk(xk) ≥ α ∀k and ∑xk = e. From Lemma 1 we know
that there exists C > 0 such that U j(xj) < C for all (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Aα. Notice
that our sequence (xk(n)) ∈ Aα for n large enough.
Since bj = +∞ we can choose M very big such that
vj +
uj′(−M)cj
m− 1 > C.
Now consider the sequence (y1(n), y2(n), . . . , ym(n)) defined as follows
yis(n) := x
i
s(n)−
xis − |es|
m− 1 +M with s ∈ S
i
n,
yjs(n) := x
j
s(n) +
xis − |es|
m− 1 −M with s ∈ S
i
n.
Let yks = x
k
s with every k 6= i, j or s /∈ Sin.
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Notice that
∑
i y
i(n) = e, and yis(n) ≤ xis(n), yjs(n) ≥ xjs(n) for all s. We
will prove that {U l(yl(n))}l=1,m is bounded below by α, but U j(yj(n)) is not
bounded above by C. And this is a contradiction.
Indeed,
U i(yi(n))− U i(xi(n)) =
∑
s∈Sin
piis(u
i(yis(n))− ui(xis(n)))
≥
∑
s∈Sin
piisu
i′(xis(n)−
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 +M)(−
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 +M)
≥
∑
s∈Sin
piisu
i′(M)(− x
i
s(n)
m− 1) + u
i′(M)(
|es|
m− 1 +M)
∑
s∈Sin
piis
≥ −u
i′(M)
m− 1
∑
s∈Sin
piisx
i
s(n) + u
i′(M)(
|es|
m− 1 +M)
∑
s∈Sin
piis.
When n → ∞, the second term of the right hand side term in the inequality
above tends to zero while first term tends to −ui′(M)cim−1 . Thus,
lim sup
n→∞
U i(yi(n)) ≥ vi − u
i′(M)ci
m− 1 ≥ v
i − u
i′(0)ci
m− 1 > α.
For n large enough, Uk(yk(n)) is bounded below by α,∀k 6= j. Then we can
estimate the limit of U j(yj(n)) when n→∞,
U j(yj(n))− U j(xj(n)) =
∑
s∈Sin
pijs(u
j(yjs(n))− uj(xjs(n)))
≥
∑
s∈Sin
pijsu
j′(xjs(n) +
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 −M)(
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 −M)
U j(yj(n))− U j(xj(n)) ≥
∑
s∈Sin
pijsu
j′(−M)(x
i
s(n)− |es|
m− 1 −M)
≥ u
j′(−M)
m− 1
∑
s∈Sin
pijsx
i
s(n)−Muj′(−M)
∑
s∈Sin
pijs −
uj′(−M)
m− 1
∑
s∈Sin
|es|pijs.
Take the limit
lim sup
n→∞
U j(yj(n)) ≥ vj + u
j′(−M)cj
m− 1 > C.
A contradiction. Hence A is l1(pi)-compact.
For the proof of Proposition 3, we require the following lemma
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Lemma 3 Suppose that A is bounded and (v1, v2, . . . , vm) is in the closure of
U . Suppose that there exists a sequence {x(n)}n ⊂ A such that there exists i
such that limn U
i(xi(n)) > vi, and for all j 6= i , limn U j(xj(n)) ≥ vj. Then
(v1, v2, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Proof : Fix t ∈ N arbitrarily. Let C > 0 be the upper bound of A in l1(pi), we
know that |xjt (n)| < Cpijt for all j and all n. Fix some j. We define the sequence
{yk(n)}k=1,...,m as follows
yk(n) = xk(n) if k 6= i, j
yis(n) = x
i
s(n) if s 6= t
yit(n) = x
i
t(n)− 
yjt (n) = x
j
t (n) + 
For k 6= i, j, limn Uk(yk(n)) = vk. And we have
U i(yi(n))− U i(xi(n)) = piit(ui(yit(n))− ui(xit(n)))
≥ piit(−)ui′(xit(n)− ) ≥ −piitui′(−
C
piit
− )
and
U j(yj(n))− U j(xj(n)) = pijt (uj(yjt (n))− uj(xjt (n)))
≥ pijt uj′(xjt (n) + ) ≥ pijtuj′(
C
pijt
+ ).
Since lim infn U
i(xi(n)) > vi, by choosing  small enough, the sequence {y(n)}n
will satisfy lim infn U
i(yi(n)) > vi and lim infn U
j(yj(n)) > vj .
By induction we can find a sequence {zk(n)}n ⊂ A which satisfies limn Uk(zk(n)) >
vk for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Hence (v1, v2, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Proof of Proposition 3
Since the (NA )condition holds, from Proposition 1, we know that U is
bounded. We will prove that U is closed. Suppose that (v1, . . . , vm) belong to
the closure of U and the sequence {x(n)}n ⊂ A such that limn U i(xi(n)) = vi.
If the sequence {x(n)}n belongs to a compact set of l1(pi), without loss of
generality, we can suppose that limn x
i(n) = xi in this topology. Since U i is
continuous, we have U i(xi) ≥ vi for all i. Thus (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
If the sequence {x(n)}n does not belong to a compact set, we can suppose
that there exists c > 0 such that for an agent i
lim
n→∞
∞∑
s=n
piis|xis(n)| = c.
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As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can choose a pair (i, j) which satisfies
the two properties:
1. ∃ Ein ⊂ N ∩ {s ≥ n}, xis > 0 for all s ∈ Ein and
lim
n
∑
s∈Ein
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i > 0.
2. For all s ∈ Ein
xjs(n) ≤ −
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 .
With each M > 0, define the set Sin ⊂ Ein as follows
Sin = {s : xis(n) > |es|+M(m− 1)}. (4)
We have an observation: limn
∑
Ein\Sin pi
i
sx
i
s(n) = 0. Indeed
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piisx
i
s(n) ≤
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piis (|es|+M(m− 1))
≤
∞∑
s=n
piis|es|+M(m− 1)
∞∑
s=n
piis
which tends to zero, since e ∈ l1(pi).
Hence we have Sin 6= ∅ for all n big enough, and
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Sin
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i.
We have
xjs(n) ≤
|es| − xis(n)
m− 1 < −M. (5)
Since pii and pij are equivalent, we can assume that limn
∑
s∈Sin pi
j
sxis(n) = c
j >
0. Notice that these limits do not depend on M .
Define α := min(vk, vi − ui′(0)cim−1 ) − 1, (k = 1, . . . ,m). Define Aα the set
of (xk) ∈ l1(pi) satisfies Uk(xk) ≥ α ∀k and ∑xk = e. From Lemma 1 we
know that there exists C > 0 such that U j(xj) < C for all (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Aα.
Notice that our sequence (xk(n)) ∈ Aα for n large enough. Fix  > 0. Since
ui′(+∞) = 0 we can choose M > 0 such that ui′(M) < (m− 1)/c. By similar
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2, we can construct the sequence
(yk(n)) such that:
lim inf
n→∞ U
i(yi(n)) ≥ vi − u
i′(M)ci
m− 1
lim inf
n→∞ U
j(yj(n)) ≥ vj + u
j′(−M)cj
m− 1
lim inf
n→∞ U
k(yk(n)) = vk for all k 6= i, j
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with ci, cj > 0 and ci < c and ci and cj do not depend on M .
So, for n large enough, U i(yi(n)) > vi − , and for all k 6= i, j, Uk(yk(n)) >
vk −  whereas limn U j(yj(n)) = vj + u
j′(−M)cj
m−1 > v
j + u
j′(0)cj
m−1 > v
j . Let → 0
and by applying the Lemma 3, we have (v1, v2, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed by two steps.
Step 1 We assume I2 = {i0}. Suppose that the sequence {xn} satisfies
limn U
i(xin) = v
i. We prove that (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ U . If {xn} belongs to a
compact set of l1(pi) topology, then lim infn U
i(xi) ≥ vi, hence v ∈ U .
Suppose that the sequence {xn} does not belong to a compact set. By us-
ing the same argument in the proof of Proposition 2, there exist i and j which
satisfy two properties:
1. ∃ Ein ⊂ N ∩ {s ≥ n}, xis > 0 for all s ∈ Ein and
lim
n
∑
s∈Ein
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i > 0.
2. For all s ∈ Ein
xjs(n) ≤ −
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 .
If j 6= i0, since bj = +∞, by using the same arguments in the proof of
Theorem 1 we have a contradiction.
We consider now the case j = i0. Since i 6= i0, ai = 0, by using the same
arguments in the proof of Proposition 2, we have (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Hence U is compact.
Step 2
Claim Let f1, . . . , fn, be n vectors in lp(pi), and p ∈ l∞(pi). Take any
x ∈ lp(pi) such that p · x = p ·∑i f i. Then there exists x1, . . . , xn in lp(pi) such
that
∑
i x
i = x and p · xi = p · f i for all i.
Proof of the claim. This is true for n = 1. Suppose that the claim is true for
n−1. Take any x1 such that p·x1 = p·f1. We have p·(x−x1) = p·∑ni=2 f i. Using
the hypothesis of induction, there exists x2, . . . , xn such that
∑n
i=2 x
i = x− x1
and p · xi = p · f i for all i.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we have pii = pij = piI and λia
i = λja
j = ζ,
for all i, j ∈ I2. For xI ∈ l1(pi) satisfying xI =
∑
i∈I2 x
i, with xi ∈ l1(pi), define
U I(xI) =
∑
i∈I2
λiU
i(xi).
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We consider now the economy EI with |I1| + 1 agents, |I1| agents who are
risk averse, with endowment ei, utility function U i, and the last agent (denoted
by I) with endowment eI =
∑
i∈I2 e
i, utility function U I . It is easy to verify
that agent I is risk neutral, with
U I(xIs) = ζ
∞∑
s=1
piIsx
I
s,
and the new economy satisfies (NA) condition. By Theorem 1, this economy
has an equilibrium, denote by (p∗, x∗). For all i ∈ I1, x∗i is the solution to
max
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)
s.t.
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s =
∞∑
s=1
p∗se
i
s.
and x∗I is the solution to
maxU I(xI)
s.t.
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
I
s =
∞∑
s=1
p∗se
I
s.
If U I(xi) > U I(x∗I), then p∗ · xi > p∗ · eI .
By the same arguments in the proof of the Theorem 1, there exists λ∗i > 0,
λI > 0 such that for i ∈ I1, p∗s = λipiisui′(x∗is ). For I, we have p∗s = ζpiIs = λiaipiIs ,
∀i ∈ I2, ∀s. The function U I is strictly increasing, so
p∗ · x∗I = p∗ · e∗I = p∗ ·
∑
i∈I2
ei.
By the claim, for all i ∈ I2 there exist x∗i ∈ lp(pi) such that
∑
i∈I2 x
∗i = x∗I ,
and p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ei, ∀i.
Fix i ∈ I2. Take xi such that U i(xi) > U i(x∗i). We prove that p∗ ·xi > p ·ei.
Indeed, we have
U i(xi) =
∞∑
s=1
aipiisx
i
s =
1
λi
∞∑
s=1
λia
ipiis =
1
λi
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s.
Hence U i(xi) > U i(x∗i) implies p∗ · xi > p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ei.
We have proved that (p∗, (x∗i)i) is an equilibrium of the model.
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